Differential Information Economies
By: Dionysius Glycopantis, Nicholas C. Yannelis
Publisher: Springer; 1 edition (2005)
Pages: 650
Format: Ebook (PDF)
Description
One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.
Table Of Contents
Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies
Dionysius Glycopantis, Nicholas C. Yannelis
Pages 1-53
Core Notions, Existence Results
- Information, efficiency, and the core of an economyRobert WilsonPages 55-64
- Information, efficiency and the core of an economy: Comments on Wilson’s paperDionysius Glycopantis, Nicholas C. YannelisPages 65-71
- The core of an economy with differential informationNicholas C. YannelisPages 73-86
- An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the private coreIsabelle LefebvrePages 87-103
- On the continuity of expected utilityErik J. Balder, Nicholas C. YannelisPages 105-124
- Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the coreFrank H. Page Jr.Pages 125-134
- A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economieswLeonidas C. KoutsougerasPages 135-156
- Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric informationStefan MausPages 157-171
Core and Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium Equivalence
- Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential informationEzra Einy, Diego Moreno, Benyamin ShitovitzPages 173-183
- Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economiesFrançoise Forges, Aviad Heifetz, Enrico MinelliPages 185-201
- Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive equilibrium and coreStefan MausPages 203-226
Core, Pareto Optimality and Incentive Compatibility
- Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential informationLeonidas C. Koutsougeras, Nicholas C. YannelisPages 227-248
- Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economiesGuangsug Hahn, Nicholas C. YannelisPages 249-277
- Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the coreBeth AllenPages 279-296
- Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firmTatsuro Ichiishi, Murat R. SertelPages 297-317
- Optimal multilateral contractsStefan Krasa, Anne P. VillamilPages 319-340
- Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetryMartin F. HellwigPages 341-363Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans – Jülide Yazar, Pages 365-376
Core, Pareto Optimality and Incentive Compatibility
- Incentive compatible contractible informationPhilip BondPages 377-396
Continuity and Stability
- Core concepts in economies where information is almost completeStefan Krasa, Wayne ShaferPages 397-417
- On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanismsGabrielle Demange, Roger GuesneriePages 419-440
- Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selectionDouglas GalePages 441-463
- Non-myopic learning in differential information economies: the coreKonstantinos SerfesPages 465-480
Value Allocations and the Bargaining SET
- Cooperative games with incomplete informationR.B. MyersonPages 481-505
- The value allocation of an economy with differential informationStefan Krasa, Nicholas C. YannelisPages 507-526
- Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential informationStefan Krasa, Nicholas C. YannelisPages 527-540
- The bargaining set of a large economy with differential informationEzra Einy, Diego Moreno, Benyamin ShitovitzPages 541-552
- Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength?Stefan Krasa1, Akram Temimi, Nicholas C. YannelisPages 553-565
Implementation
- Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economiesGuangsug Hahn, Nicholas C. YannelisPages 567-591
- An extensive form interpretation of the private coreDionysius Glycopantis, Allan Muir, Nicholas C. YannelisPages 593-618
- On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economiesDionysius Glycopantis, Allan Muir, Nicholas C. YannelisPages 619-650
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Sales page: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/b138401?page=2#toc
Archive: https://archive.ph/wip/vYigh
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